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Abstract
We extend EWA learning to games in which only the set of possible foregone payo®s from
unchosen strategies are known. We assume players estimate unknown foregone payo®s from a
strategy, by substituting the last payo® actually received from that strategy, or by clairvoyantly
guessing the actual foregone payo®. Either assumption improves predictive accuracy of EWA.
Learning parameters are also estimated separately for each player. Players cluster into two
separate subgroups, which do not correspond to traditional special cases of reinforcement or
belief learning.
11 Introduction
How does an equilibrium emerge in a game? After largely avoiding this di±cult question for
many decades, we are now beginning to understand how equilibration occurs, empirically. There
are two general approaches to understand learning: Population models and individual models.
Population models make predictions about how the aggregate behavior in a population will
change as a result of aggregate experience. For example, in replicator dynamics, a population's
propensity to play a certain strategy will depend on its `¯tness' (payo®) relative to the mixture
of strategies played previously. Models like this submerge di®erences in individual learning
paths.
Individual learning models allow each person to choose di®erently, depending on the ex-
periences each person has. Our `experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) model, for example,
assumes that people learn by decaying experience-weighted lagged attractions, updating them
according to received payo®s or weighted foregone payo®s, and normalizing. This very general
approach includes the key features of reinforcement and belief learning (including Cournot and
¯ctitious play), and predicts more accurately than those simple models, out-of-sample, in many
di®erent games (see Camerer, Ho, and Chong, in press for a comprehensive list).
In this paper, we the applicability of EWA in two ways.
First, we allow di®erent players to have di®erent learning parameters. In many previous
empirical applications, players are assumed to have a common learning rule (exceptions include
Cheung and Friedman, 1997; Stahl, 2000; Broseta, in press). Allowing heterogeneous parame-
ter values is an important step for three reasons. (i) While it seems very likely that detectable
heterogeneity exists, it is conceivable that allowing heterogeneity does not improve ¯t much,
in which case `representative agent' modeling with common parameter values is a useful ap-
proximation. (ii) If players are heterogeneous, it is likely that players fall into distinct clusters,
perhaps corresponding to familiar learning rules like ¯ctitious play or reinforcement learning,
or to some other kinds of clusters not yet identi¯ed.1 (iii)If players are heterogeneous, then it
is possible that a single parameter estimated from a homogeneous representative- agent model
1Camerer and Ho (1998) allowed two separate con¯gurations of parameters (or `segments') to see whether the
superior ¯t of EWA was due to its ability to mimic a population mixture of reinforcement and belief learners,
but they found that this was clearly not so. The current study serves as another test of this possibility, with
more reliable estimation of parameters for all players.
2will misspecify the mean of the distribution of parameters across individuals. We test for any
such bias by comparing the mean of individual estimates with the single representative-agent
estimate.
Second, most theories of learning assume that players know the foregone payo®s to strategies
they did not choose. Theories di®er in the extent to which unchosen strategies are reinforced
by foregone payo®s. (For example, belief learning theories are essentially just generalized rein-
forcement theories in which unchosen strategies are reinforced as strongly as chosen strategies
are.) But then, as Vriend (1997) ¯rst noted, how does learning occur when players are not sure
what foregone payo®s are? This is a crucial question for applying these theories to naturally-
occurring situations in which the modeler may not know the foregone payo®s. In this paper we
suggest two ways to add learning about unknown foregone payo®s (`payo® learning') to describe
learning in low-information environments.
The basic results can be easily stated. We estimated individual-level EWA parameters
for 60 subjects who played a normal-form centipede game (with extensive-form feedback) 100
times (see Nagel and Tang, 1998). Parameters do di®er systematically across individuals.
While parameter estimates do not cluster naturally around the values predicted by belief or
reinforcement models, they do cluster in a striking way into learning in which attractions
cumulate past payo®s, and learning in which attractions are averages of past payo®s.
Two payo® learning models are used to describe how subjects estimate foregone payo®s,
then use these estimates to reinforce strategies whose foregone payo®s are not known precisely.
Both are substantial improvements over the default assumption that these strategies are not
reinforced at all (e.g., reinforcement models). The best model is the one in which subjects
update unchosen strategies with perfect guesses of their foregone payo®s.
2 EWA Learning with Partial Payo® Information
2.1 The Basic EWA Model
Experience-weighted attraction learning was introduced to hybridize elements of reinforcement
and belief-based approaches to learning and includes familiar variants of both as special cases.
This section will highlight only the most important features of the model. Further details are
available in Camerer and Ho (1999).
3In EWA learning, strategies have attraction levels which are updated according to either
the payo®s the strategies actually provided, or some fraction of the payo®s unchosen strate-
gies would have provided. These attractions are decayed or depreciated each period, and also
normalized by a factor which captures the (decayed) amount of experience players have accumu-
lated. Attractions to strategies are then related to the probability of choosing those strategies
using a response function which guarantees that more attractive strategies are played more
often.
EWA was originally designed to study n-person normal form games. The players are indexed
by i (i = 1; 2; : : : ;n), and each one has a strategy space Si = fs1i ; s2i ; : : : ; smi¡1i ; smii g, where si
denotes a pure strategy of player i. The strategy space for the game is the Cartesian products of
the Si, S = S1£S2£ : : :£Sn. Let s = (s1; s2; : : : ; sn) denote a strategy combination consisting
of n strategies, one for each player. Let s¡i = (s1; : : : ; si¡1; si+1; : : : ; sn) denote the strategies of
everyone but player i. The game description is completed with speci¯cation of a payo® function
¼i(si; s¡i) 2 <, which is the payo® i receives for playing si when everyone else is playing the
strategy speci¯ed in the strategy combination s¡i. Finally, let si(t) denote i's actual strategy
choice in period t, and s¡i(t) the vector chosen by all other players. Thus, player i's payo® in
period t is given by ¼i(si(t); s¡i(t)).
2.2 Updating Rules
The EWA model updates two variables after each round. The ¯rst variable is the experience
weight N(t), which is like a count of `observation-equivalents' of past experience and is used to
weight lagged attractions when they are updated. The second variable is Aji (t), the attraction
of a strategy after period t has taken place. The variables N(t) and Aji(t) begin with initial
values N(0) and Aji (0). These prior values can be thought of as re°ecting pregame experience,
either due to learning transferred from di®erent games or due to introspection.
Updating after a period of play is governed by two rules. First, experience weights are
updated according to
N(t) = Á ¢ (1¡ ·) ¢N (t ¡ 1) + 1; t ¸ 1: (2.1)
The second rule updates the level of attraction. A key component of the updating is the
payo® that a strategy either yielded, or would have yielded, in a period. The model weights
4hypothetical payo®s that unchosen strategies would have earned by a parameter ±, and weights
payo® actually received, from chosen strategy si(t), by an additional 1¡ ± (so it receives a total
weight of 1). Using an indicator function I(x;y) which equals 1 if x = y and 0 if x 6= y, the
weighted payo® for i's jth strategy can be written [±+(1¡±)¢I(sji ; si(t))]¢¼i(sji ; s¡i(t)). The rule
for updating attraction sets Aji (t) to be a depreciated, experience-weighted lagged attraction,
plus an increment for the received or foregone payo®, normalized by the new experience weight.
That is,
Aji (t) =
Á ¢N (t ¡ 1) ¢ Aji(t ¡ 1) + [±+ (1¡ ±) ¢ I(sji; si(t))] ¢ ¼i(sji ; s¡i(t))
N(t)
: (2.2)
The factor Á is a discount factor that depreciates previous attractions. The parameter ·
adjusts whether the experience weight depreciates more rapidly than the attractions. Notice
that the steady-state value ofN(t) is 11¡Á(1¡·) (and does not depend on N(0)). In the estimation
we usually impose the restriction N (0) · 11¡Á(1¡·) which guarantees that the experience weight
rises over time, so the relative weight on new payo®s falls and learning slows down.
Finally, attractions must be related to the probabilities of choosing strategies in some way.
Obviously we would like P ji (t) to be monotonically increasing in A
j
i (t) and decreasing in A
k
i (t)
(where k 6= j). Three forms have been used in previous research: A logit or exponential
form, a power form, and a normal (probit) form. The various probability functions each have
advantages and disadvantages. We prefer the logit form
Pji (t+ 1) =
e ¢¸A
j
i (t)Pmi
k=1 e
¸¢Aki (t)
(2.3)
because it allows negative attractions and ¯ts a little better in a direct comparison with the
power form (Camerer and Ho, 1998). The parameter ¸ measures sensitivity of players to
di®erences among attractions. When ¸ is small, probabilities are not very sensitive to di®erences
in attractions (when ¸ = 0 all strategies are equally likely to be chosen). As ¸ in creases, it
converges to a best-response function in which the strategy with the highest attraction is always
chosen.
2.3 The Cumulative Reinforcement Special Case of EWA
One special case of EWA is choice reinforcement models in which strategies have levels of
reinforcement or propensity which are depreciated and incremented by received payo®s. In the
5model of Harley (1981) and Roth and Erev (1995), Erev and Roth (1998), for example
Rji (t) =
8<: Á ¢R
j
i (t ¡ 1) + ¼i(sji ; s¡i(t)) if sji = si(t);
Á ¢Rji (t ¡ 1) if sji 6= si(t):
(2.4)
Using the indicator function, the two equations can be reduced to one:
Rji (t) = Á ¢Rji (t ¡ 1) + I(sji ; si(t)) ¢ ¼i(sji ; s¡i(t)): (2.5)
It is easy to see that this updating formula is a special case of the EWA rule, when ± = 0,
N(0) = 1, and · = 1. The reinforcement model is extremely simple; in fact, it is too simple and
has been largely abandoned by cognitive psychologists studying humans in favor of algorithmic
information processing models or connectionist neural networks. Nonetheless, the adequacy of
the model can be tested empirically by setting the parameters to their restricted values and
seeing how much ¯t is compromised (adjusting, of course, for degrees of freedom).
2.4 The Averaged Reinforcement Special Case of EWA
In another kind of reinforcement, attractions are averages of previous attractions, and reinforce-
ments, rather than cumulations (e.g. Sarin and Vahid, 1997; Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1994,
1997). For example
Rji (t) = Á ¢ Rji (t ¡ 1) + (1¡ Á) ¢ I(sji; si(t)) ¢ ¼i(sji ; s¡i(t)): (2.6)
A little algebra shows that this updating formula is a special case of the EWA rule, when ± = 0,
N(0) = 11¡Á , and ·= 0.
2.5 The Belief-Based Special Case of EWA
In belief-based models, adaptive players base their responses on beliefs formed by observing
their opponents' past plays. While there are many ways of forming beliefs, we consider a fairly
6general `weighted ¯ctitious play' model, which includes ¯ctitious play (Brown, 1951; Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998) and Cournot best-response (Cournot, 1960) as special cases.
In weighted ¯ctitious play, players begin with prior beliefs about what the other players will
do, which are expressed as ratios of counts to the total experience. Denote total experience
by N (t) =
Pm¡i
k=1 N
k¡i(t).2 Express the probability that others will play strategy k as Bk¡i(t) =
Nk¡i(t)
N(t) , with N
k¡i(t) ¸ 0 and N (t) > 0.
Beliefs are updated by depreciating the previous counts by Á, and adding one for the strategy
combination actually chosen by the other players. That is,
Bk¡i(t) =
Á ¢Nk¡i(t¡ 1) + I(sk¡i; s¡i(t))Pm¡i
h=1[Á ¢Nh¡i(t ¡ 1) + I(sh¡i; s¡i(t))]
: (2.7)
This form of belief updating weights the belief from one period ago Á times as much as the most
recent observation, so Á can be interpreted as how quickly previous experience is discarded.3
When Á = 0 players weight only the most recent observation (Cournot dynamics); when Á= 1
all previous observations count equally (¯ctitious play).
Given these beliefs, we can compute expected payo®s in each period t,
Eji (t) =
m¡iX
k=1
Bk¡i(t)¼(s
j
i ; s
k¡i): (2.8)
The crucial step is to express period t expected payo®s as a function of period t ¡ 1 expected
payo®s. This yields:
Eji (t) =
Á ¢N(t¡ 1) ¢Eji (t ¡ 1) +¼(sji ; s¡i(t))
Á ¢N(t¡ 1) + 1 : (2.9)
Expressing expected payo®s as a function of lagged expected payo®s, the belief terms disappear
into thin air. This is because the beliefs are only used to compute expected payo®s, and when
beliefs are formed according to weighted ¯ctitious play, the expected payo®s which result can
2Note that N(t) is not subscripted because the count of frequencies is assumed, in our estimation, to be the
same for all players. Obviously this restriction can be relaxed in future research.
3Some people interpret this parameter as an index of `forgetting', but this interpretation is misleading because
people may recall the previous experience perfectly (or have it available in `external memory' on computer
software) but they will deliberately discount old experience if they think new information is more useful in
forecasting what others will do.
7also be generated by generalized reinforcement according to previous payo®s. More precisely,
if the initial attractions in the EWA model are expected payo®s given some initial beliefs (i.e.,
Aji (0) = E
j
i (0)), · = 0, and foregone payo®s are weighted as strongly as received payo®s (± = 1),
then EWA attractions are exactly the same as expected payo®s.
This demonstrates a close kinship between reinforcement and belief approaches. Belief
learning is nothing more than generalized attraction learning in which strategies are reinforced
equally strongly by actual payo®s and foregone payo®s, attractions are weighted averages of
past attractions and reinforcements, and initial attractions spring from prior beliefs. This
relation is quite surprising and previous scholars did not notice it. For example, Selten (in
press) wrote,\In rote [reinforcement] learning success and failure directly in°uence the choice
probabilities. Belief learning is very di®erent. Here experiences strengthen or weaken beliefs.
Belief learning has only an indirect in°uence on behavior. (emphasis ours). The EWA model
shows that when beliefs are formed by weighted ¯ctitious play, the \indirect in°uence" Selten
referred to is exactly the same as a certain kind of direct in°uence.
2.6 Interpreting EWA
The EWA parameters have the following psychological interpretations.
1. The parameter ± measures the relative weight given to foregone payo®s, compared to
actual payo®s, in updating attractions. It can be interpreted as a kind of \imagination"
of foregone payo®s, or responsiveness to foregone payo®s (when ± is larger players move
more strongly toward ex post best responses). We call it \consideration" of foregone
payo®s.
2. The parameter Á is naturally interpreted as depreciation of past attractions, A(t). In a
game-theoretic context, Á will be a®ected by the degree to which players realize other
players are adapting, so that old observations on what others did become less and less
useful. Then Á can be interpreted as an index of (perceived) change.
3. The parameter · determines the growth rate of attractions, which in turn a®ects how
sharply players converge. When · = 1 then N(t) = 1 (for t > 0) and the denominator in
the attraction updating equation disappears. Thus, attractions cumulate past payo®s as
8quickly as possible. When ·= 0, attractions are weighted averages of lagged attractions
and past payo®s, where the weights are Á ¢N(0) and 1.
In the logit model, whether attractions cumulate payo®s, or average them, is important
because only the di®erence among the attractions matters for their their relative probabil-
ities of being chosen. (A constant added to all the attractions divides out in the logit form,
so only the di®erence between two strategy's attractions a®ects their relative probability.)
If attractions can grow and grow, as they can when ·= 1 then the di®erences in strategy
attractions can be very large. This implies that, for a ¯xed response sensitivity, ¸, the
probabilities can be spread farther apart; convergence to playing a single strategy almost
all the time can be sharper. If attractions cannot grow outside of the payo® bounds,
when · = 0 then convergence cannot produce choice probabilities which are so extreme.
Thus, we think of · as an index of the degree of commitment to one choice or another
(it could also be thought of as a convergence index, or con¯dence). When · is large then
attractions are cumulating payo®s rapidly, and the probability of choosing one strategy
will grow closer to one. When · is small, the attractions are not growing as rapidly and
probability will be spread more evenly across strategies.
4. The term Aji (0) represents the initial attraction, which might be derived from some analy-
sis of the game, from selection principles or decision rules, from surface similarity between
strategies in the game being played and strategies which were successful in similar games,
etc. Belief models impose strong restrictions on Aji (0) by requiring initial attractions to
be derived from prior beliefs.4 Additionally, they require attraction updating with ± = 1
and ·= 0. EWA allows one to separate these two processes: Players could have arbitrary
initial attractions but begin to update attractions in a belief-learning way after they gain
experience.
5. The initial-attraction weight N(0) is in the EWA model to allow players in belief-based
models to have an initial prior which has a strength (measured in units of actual ex-
perience). In EWA, N(0) is therefore naturally interpreted as the strength of initial
attractions, relative to incremental changes in attractions due to actual experience and
4This requires, for example, that weakly dominated strategies will always have (weakly) lower initial attrac-
tions than dominant strategies. EWA allows more °exibility. For example, players might choose randomly at
¯rst, choose what they chose previously in a di®erent game, or set a strategy's initial attraction equal to its
minimum payo® (the minimax rule) or maximum payo® (the maximax rule). All these decision rules generate
initial attractions which are not generally allowed by belief models, but are permitted in EWA because Aji(0)
are °exible.
9payo®s. The e®ect of N(0) is easiest to see by ¯xing ± = 1 for simplicity and directly
computing the attraction after two periods, Aji (2), which gives
Aji (2) =
Á2 ¢Aji (0) ¢ N(0) +Á ¢ ¼i(sji ; s¡i(1)) +¼i(sji ; s¡i(2))
Á2 ¢ (1¡ ·)2 ¢N (0) +Á ¢ (1¡ ·) + 1 : (2.10)
The parameter Á captures the declining weight placed on payo®s from more distant periods
of actual experience (that is, the period 1 payo® ¼i(sji ; s¡i(1)) is weighted Á but the period
2 payo® ¼i(sji ; s¡i(2)) is not). Like previous payo®s, the initial attraction is also weighted
by a power of Á (Á2, because it `happened' two periods earlier), but is also weighted
by N(0). Thus, the parameter N(0) captures the special weight placed on the initial
attractions, compared to increments in attraction due to actual (or foregone) payo®s. If
N (0) is small then the e®ect of the initial attractions wears o® very quickly (compared to
the e®ect of actual experience). If N (0) is large then the e®ect of the initial attractions
persists.5
In previous research, the EWA model has been estimated on several samples of experimental
data, and estimates have been used to predict out-of-sample. Compared to the belief and
reinforcement special cases, EWA ¯ts better in weak- link coordination games (Camerer and Ho,
1998; out-of-sample accuracy was not measured) and predicts better out of sample in median-
action coordination games and dominance solvable \p-beautycontests" (Camerer and Ho, 1999),
call markets (Hsia, 1998),\unpro¯table games" (Morgan and Sefton, forthcoming), partially-
dominance-solvable R&D games (Rapoport and Almadoss, 2000), and in unpublished estimates
we made in other \continental divide" coordination games (Van Huyck, Cook, and Battalio,
1997). EWA only predicted substantially worse than belief learning in some constant-sum
games (Camerer and Ho, 1999), and has never predicted substantially worse than reinforcement
learning.
To help illustrate how EWA hybridizes features of other theories, Figure 1 shows a three-
dimensional parameter space{ a cube{ in which the parameters are ±, Á, and ·. Traditional
belief and reinforcement theories assume that learning parameters are located on speci¯c edges
of the cube. For example, cumulative reinforcement theories require low consideration (± = 0)
and high commitment (· = 1). (Note that the combination of low consideration and high
commitment may be the worst possible combination, since such players can get quickly locked
5This enables one to test equilibrium theories as a special kind of (non)-learning theory with N(0) very large
and initial attractions equal to equilibrium payo®s.
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in to strategies which are far from best responses.) Belief models are represented by points on
the edge where consideration is high (± = 1) but commitment is low (· = 0). This constrains
the ability of belief models to produce sharp convergence, in coordination games for example
(Camerer and Ho, 1998,1999). Cournot best- response and ¯ctitious play learning are vertices
at the ends of the belief- model edge.
Looking at Figure 1, it is unclear why players' parameter values might cluster on those
edges or vertices (as opposed to other areas, or the interior of the cube). In fact, we shall see
below that there is no prominent clustering in the regions corresponding to familiar belief and
reinforcement models, but there is substantial clustering near the faces where commitment is
either low (· = 0) or high (·= 1).
2.7 EWA Extensions to Partial Payo® Information
Our approach to explaining learning in environments with partial payo® information is to
assume that players form some guess about what the foregone payo® might be, then plug it
into the attraction updating equation. This adds no free parameters to the model.
First de¯ne the estimate of the foregone payo® as ¼^i(sji ; t) (and ¼^ is just the known foregone
payo® when it is known). Note that ¼^i(sji ; t) does not generally depend on s¡i(t) because, by
de¯nition, if the other players' strategy was observed then the foregone payo® would be known.
Hence, when the foregone payo® is not known, updating is done according to
Nji (t) = ½ ¢Nji (t¡ 1) + 1; t ¸ 1: (2.11)
and
Aji (t) =
Á ¢Nji (t¡ 1) ¢Aji (t¡ 1) + ± ¢ ¼^i(sji ; t)
Nji (t)
: (2.12)
We try two separate speci¯cations of ¼^(sji; t): Last actual payo® updating, and payo®
clairvoyance. When players update according to the last actual payo®, they recall the last
payo® they actually received from a strategy, and use that as an estimate of the foregone
payo®. Formally,
11
¼^i(s
j
i ; t) =
8<: ¼i(s
j
i ; s¡i(t)) if s
j
i = si(t);
¼^i(s
j
i ; t ¡ 1) otherwise:
(2.13)
To complete the speci¯cation, the estimates ¼^i(sji ;0) are initialized as the average of all the
possible elements of the set of foregone payo®s. For example, suppose player A chooses 7 and
player B chooses 8 or higher. Since player A \took ¯rst" she receives a payo® of 32, and she
knows that if she chose 9 instead, she would receive either 11, if player B chose 8, or 64 if
player B chose 10, 12, or 14. In this case we would initialize ¼^i(9;0) = (11 + 64)=2. Notice that
we average only the unique elements of the payo® set, not each payo® associated with every
strategy pair. That is, even though 64 would result if player A chose 8 and B chose 10, 12, or
14, we only use the payo® 64 once, not three times, in computing the initial ¼^.
Updating using the last actual payo® is cognitively economical because it requires players
to remember only the last payo® they received. Furthermore, it enables them to adjust rapidly
when other players' behavior is changing, by immediately discounting all previous received
payo®s and focussing only the most recent one.
On the other hand, if one thinks of the last actual payo® as an implicit forecast of what
payo® is likely to have been the `true' foregone one, then it may be a poor forecast when
the last actual payo® was received many periods ago, or if subjects have hunches about which
foregone payo® they would have gotten which are more accurate than distant history. Therefore,
we consider an opposite assumption as well{ `payo® clairvoyance'. Under payo® clairvoyance,
¼^i(sji ; t) = ¼i(s
j
i ; s¡i(t)). That is, players accurately guess exactly what the foregone payo®
would have been even though, strictly speaking, there is no way they could know this.
There are other assumptions one could consider, but these two represent opposite points
in terms of information use. The last-actual-payo® scheme recalls only observed history and
does not try to improve upon it (as a forecast); consequently, it can also be applied when
players do not even know the set of possible foregone payo®s. The payo®-clairvoyance scheme
uses knowledge which the subject is not told (but could conceivably ¯gure out). We report
estimates and ¯t measures for both models.
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3 Data
Nagel and Tang (1998) (NT) studied learning in an extensive-form centipede game. In their
game, an Odd player has the opportunity to take the majority of a growing `pie' at odd num-
bered decision nodes f1,3,5,7,9,11,13g; the Even player has the opportunity to take at nodes
f2,4,6,8,10,12,14g. Each player chooses when to take by choosing a number. The lower of the
two numbers determines when the pie stops growing and how much each player gets. The per-
son who chooses the lower number always gets more. Table 1 shows the payo®s to the players
from taking at each node. (Points are worth .005 deutschemarks).
They conducted ¯ve sessions with 12 subjects in each, playing 100 rounds in a random-
matching ¯xed-role protocol. A crucial design feature is that while the players choose normal-
form strategies, they are given extensive-form feedback. That is, each pair of subjects is only
told the lower number chosen in each round, corresponding to the time at which the pie is taken
and the game stops. The player choosing the lower number does not know the higher number.
For example, if Odd chooses 5, takes ¯rst, and earns 16, she is not sure whether she would have
earned 6 by taking later, at node 7 (if Even's number was 6) or whether she would have earned
32 (if Even had taken at 8 or higher), because she only knows that Even's choice was higher
than 5. This ambiguity about foregone payo®s is an important challenge for implementing
learning models.
Table 2 shows the overall frequencies of choices (pooled across the ¯ve sessions, which are
similar). Most players choose numbers from 7 to 11.
If a subject's number was the lower one (i.e., they chose "take"), there is a strong tendency
to choose the same number, or a higher number, on the next round. This can be seen in the
transition matrix Table 3, which shows the relative frequency of choices in round t+1 as a
function of the choice in round t, for players who `take' in round t (choosing the lower number).
For example, the top row shows that when players choose 2 and take, they choose 2 in the next
round 28% of the time, but 8% choose 4 and 32% choice 6, which is the median choice (and is
underlined). For choices below 6, the median choice in the next period is always higher. The
overall tendency for players who chose "take" to choose numbers which increase, decrease, or
are unchanged are shown in Figure 2a. Note that most "takers" then choose numbers which
increase, but this tendency shrinks over time.
Table 4 shows the opposite pattern for players who choose the higher number and \pass"{
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they tend to choose lower numbers. In addition, as the experiment progressed this pattern of
transitions became weaker (more subjects do not change at all), as Figure 2a shows.
NT consider several models. Four are benchmarks which assume no learning: Nash equilib-
rium (players pick 1 and 2), quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) random
play, and an individual observed-frequency model which uses each player's observed frequencies
of choices over all 100 rounds. NT test choice-reinforcement of the Harley-Roth-Erev RPS type
and implement weighted ¯ctitious play in an odd way, which assumes players have population
history information which they don't actually have. The equilibrium and weighted ¯ctitious
play predictions are terrible. This is not surprising because both theories predict either low
numbers at the start, or steady movement toward lower numbers over time, which is obviously
not present in the data. QRE and random guessing don't predict too badly, but the individual-
frequency benchmark is the best of all. The RPS (reinforcement) models do almost as well as
the best benchmark.
4 Estimation Methodology
The method of maximum likelihood was used to estimate the various model
parameters. We used the ¯rst 70% of the data to calibrate the models and the last 30% of
the data to predict out-of-sample. Note well that out-of-sample forecasting completely removes
any advantage more complicated models have over simpler ones which are special cases.
We ¯rst estimated a homogeneous single-representative agent model for reinforcement, be-
lief, and four variants of EWA payo® learning. We then estimated the EWA models at the
individual level for all 60 subjects. In the centipede game, each subject has seven strategies,
numbers 1;3; : : : ; 13 for Odd subjects and 2; 4; : : : ;14 for even subjects. Since the game is
asymmetric, the models for Odd and Even players were estimated separately. The log of the
likelihood function for the single-representative agent EWA model is
LL(±; Á; ·; ;¸N (0); ¿) =
30X
i=1
70X
t=2
log(PSi(t)i (t)) (4.1)
and for the individual level model for player i is:
LL(±;Á;·;¸;N (0); ¿) =
70X
t=2
log(PSi(t)i (t)) (4.2)
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where the probabilities P Si(t)i (t) are given by equation (2.3).
There is one substantial change from methods we previously used in Camerer and Ho (1999).
We estimated initial attractions (common to all players) from the ¯rst period of actual data,
rather than allowing them to be free parameters which are estimated as part of the overall
maximization of likelihood.6 We switched to this method because estimating initial attractions
for each of the the large number of strategies chewed up too many degrees of freedom.
To search for regularity in the distributions of individual-level parameter estimates, we
conducted a cluster analysis on the three most important parameters, ±, Á, and ·. We speci¯ed a
number of clusters and searched iteratively for cluster means in the three-dimensional parameter
space which maximizes the ratio of the distance between the cluster means and the average
within-cluster deviation from the mean. We report results from two- cluster speci¯cations, since
they have special relevance for evaluating whether parameters cluster around the predictions of
belief and reinforcement theories. Searching for a third cluster generally improved the ¯t very
little.8
6Others have used this method too, e.g., Roth and Erev (1995). Formally, de¯ne the ¯rst-period frequency
of strategy j in the population as fj. Then initial attractions are recovered from the equations
e¸¢A
j(0)P
k e
¸¢Ak(0) = f
j; j = 1; : : : ;m (4.3)
(This is equivalent to choosing initial attractions to maximize the likelihood of the ¯rst-period data, separately
from the rest of the data, for a value of ¸ derived from the overall likelihood-maximization.) Some algebra shows
that the initial attractions can be solved for, as a function of ¸, by
Aj(0)¡ 1
m
X
j
Aj(0) =
1
¸
ln( ~fj); j = 1; : : : ;m (4.4)
where ~fj = f
j
(¦kfk)
1
m
is a measure of relative frequency of strategy j. We ¯x the strategy j with the lowest
frequency to have Aj(0) = 0 (which is necessary for identi¯cation) and solve for the other attractions as a
function of ¸ and the frequencies ~f j.
Estimation of the belief-based model (a special case of EWA) is a little trickier. Attractions are equal to
expected payo®s given initial beliefs; therefore, we searched for initial beliefs which optimized the likelihood of
observing the ¯rst-period data.7
8Speci¯cally, a three-segment model always leads to a tiny segment that contains either 1 or 2 subjects.
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5 Results
We discuss the results in three parts: Basic estimation and model ¯ts; comparison of two
payo®-learning extensions, and individual-level estimates and uncovered clusters.
5.1 Basic estimation and model ¯ts
Table 5 reports the log-likelihood of the various models, both in-sample and out-of-sample. The
belief-based model is clearly worst by all measures. This is no surprise because the centipede
game is dominance-solvable. Any belief learning should move players in the direction of lower
numbers, but the numbers they choose rise slightly over time. The EWA-Payo® Clairvoyance
is better than the EWA - Recent Actual Payo®. Reinforcement is worse than any of the EWA
variants, and by about 50 points of log-likelihood out-of-sample when compared to the best
EWA model. (It can also be strongly rejected in- sample using standard Â2 tests.)
Another way to judge model ¯t is to see how well the EWA model estimates capture the
basic patterns in the data. There are two basic patterns: (i) players who choose the lower
number (and `take earlier', in centipede jargon) tend to increase their number more often than
they decrease it, and this tendency decreases over time; and (ii) players who choose the higher
number (`taking later'), tend to decrease their numbers.
Figures 2a show these patterns in the data and Figures 2b-c show how well the EWA model
describes and predicts these patterns. The EWA predictions are generally quite accurate. Note
that if EWA were over¯tting in the ¯rst 70 periods, accuracy would degrade badly in the last
30 periods (when parameter estimates are ¯xed and out-of-sample prediction begins); but it
generally doesn't.
5.2 Payo® learning models
Tables 5 show measures of ¯t and parameter estimates for two di®erent payo® learning models.
The two models either use the last actual payo® or the clairvoyantly known payo®. Both
payo® learning models perform better than reinforcement (which implicitly assumes that the
estimated foregone payo® is zero, or gives it zero weight by setting ± = 0). This illustrates that
EWA can improve statistically on its special cases, even when foregone payo®s are not known.
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By simply adding a payo®-learning assumption to EWA, the extended model outpredicts the
simpler models. Building on our idea, the same superiority of EWA supplemented by payo®
learning is shown by Anderson (1998) in bandit problems and Chen (1999), in a study of joint
cost allocation.
The two payo® learning assumptions embody low and high degrees of player knowledge. The
assumption that players recall only the last actual payo®{ which may have been received many
periods ago{ means they ignore deeper intuitions about which of the possible payo®s might be
the correct foregone one in the very last period. Oppositely, the payo® clairvoyance assumption
assumes the players somehow ¯gure out exactly which foregone payo® they would have gotten.
Surprisingly, the payo® clairvoyance assumption predicts better. The right interpretation is
surely not that subjects are truly clairvoyant, always guessing the true foregone payo® perfectly,
but simply that their implicit foregone payo® estimate is sometimes closer to the truth than
the last actual payo® is. For example, consider a player B who chooses 6 and has the lower of
the two numbers. If she had chosen strategy 8 instead, she doesn't know whether the foregone
payo® would have been 8 (if the other A subject chose 7), or 45 (if the A subject chose 9, 11, or
13). The payo® clairvoyance assumption says she knows precisely whether it would have been
8 or 45 (i.e., whether subject A chose 7, or chose 9 or more). While this requires knowledge she
doesn't have, it only has to be a better guess than the last actual payo® she got from choosing
8.
5.3 Individual di®erences
The fact that Nagel and Tang's game lasted 100 trials enabled us to estimate individual-level
parameters with some reliability (while imposing common initial attractions). Figures 3a-b
show scatter plots of the 30 estimates from the EWA-Payo® Clairvoyance model in a three-
parameter ±¡ Á¡ · space. Each point represents a triple of estimates for a speci¯c player; a
vertical projection to the bottom face of the cube helps the eye locate the point in space and
measure its Á¡ · values. Figure 3a shows Odd players and Figure 3b shows Even players. As
shown, both ¯gures are very similar and suggest that there is no di®erence between odd and
even players. In addition, these parameter estimates are clearly grouped into two clusters.
Individuals do not particularly fall into clusters corresponding to any of the familiar special
cases (compare Figure 1 and Figures 3a-b). For example, only two out of sixty subjects are
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near the cumulative reinforcement line ± = 0;· = 1 (the "bottom back wall"). Similarly, eight
out of sixty subjects are clustered near the weighted ¯ctitious play line where ± = 1; ·= 0.
Table 6 shows the mean of the parameter estimates, along with standard deviations across
subjects, for the EWA model. Results for Odd and Even players are reported separately, because
the game is not symmetric. The separate reporting also serves as a kind of robustness check,
since there is no reason to expect their learning parameters to be systematically di®erent; and
in fact, the parameters are quite similar for the two groups of subjects. The consideration
parameter ± ranges from .44 to .47, the change parameter Á varies only a little, from .90 to .91,
and the commitment parameter · from .34 to 0.38. The standard deviations of ± and · are
large, which indicates the presence of substantial heterogeneity.
We normalize the three parameter estimates by substracting them from their means and
dividing them by their ranges. (Milligan and Cooper (1985) studied eight normalization meth-
ods and showed that this was the best). We use a k-mean clustering algorithm and apply
Calinski and Harabasz (1974)'s method to determine the the optimal number of clusters.9 For
both players , the optimal number of clusters is two. The means and within-cluster standard
deviations of parameter values are given in Table 7. The subjects can be sorted into two clus-
ters, one is twice the size of the other. Both clusters tend to have ± around .45 and Á around
.8-.9; however, in one cluster · is very close to zero and in the other cluster · is close to one.
Graphically, subjects tend to cluster on the front wall representing low (· = 0) commitment,
and the back wall representing high (·= 1) commitment.
In earlier work we typically estimated a model in which all players are assumed to have the
same learning parameters (i.e., a representative agent approach). Econometrically, it is possible
that a parameter estimated with that approach will give a biased estimate of the population
mean of the same parameter across individuals, when there is heterogeneity. We can test for this
danger directly by comparing the mean of parameter estimates in Table 6 with estimates from a
single-agent analysis assuming homogeneity. The estimates are not wildly dissimilar, but there
9The method picks the optimal number of cluster by maximizing the following index:
trace(B)=g ¡ 1
trace(W)=n¡ g (5.1)
where n= 30 is the number of odd (or even) subjects, g is the number of clusters,B is the between sum of squares
cross product matrice, W is the within sum of squares cross product matrice, and the trace function represents
the sum of all diagnoal elements in a matrice. Milligan and Cooper (1985) reported that this procedure generally
performs the best and recovers the true clusters in more than 90% of the cases.
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are some slight biases which are worth noting. Speci¯cally, ± tends to be under-estimated by
the representative-agent model, and is estimated to be 0.28 when the mean of sample estimates
is around .45. Furthermore, the parameter · from the single-agent model tends to take the
extreme value of 0 or 1, when the sample means are around .36. Since there is substantial
heterogeneity among subjects{ the clusters show that subjects tend to have high ·'s near 1, or
low values near 0{ the single-agent model seems to use a kind of `majority rule' in loglikelihood
and chooses one extreme value or the other, rather than choosing the sample mean.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we extend our experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to games
in which players know the set of possible foregone payo®s from unchosen strategies, but do
not precisely which payo® they would have gotten. This extension is crucial for applying the
model to naturally-occurring situations in which the modeller (and even the players) do not
know much about the foregone payo®s.
To model how players respond to unknown foregone payo®s, we allowed players to learn
about them by substituting the last payo®s received when those strategies were actually played,
or by clairvoyantly guessing the actual foregone payo®s. Our results show that these payo®-
learning EWA models ¯t and predict better than reinforcement and belief learning. The
clairvoyant-guessing model ¯ts slightly better than the last-actual-payo® model.
We also estimated parameters separately for each individual player. The individual esti-
mates showed there is substantial heterogeneity, but individuals could not be sharply clustered
into either reinforcement or belief- based models (though several did have weighted ¯ctitious
play learning parameters). They could, however, be clustered into two distinct subgroups,
corresponding to averaging and cumulating of attraction. Compared to the means of individ-
ual level estimates, the parameter estimates from the single-agent model have a tendency to
modestly underestimate ± and take extreme values for · when the average is around 0.36.
Future research should apply these payo®-learning speci¯cations, and others, to environ-
ments in which foregone payo®s are unknown (see Anderson, 1998, and Chen, 1999). If we can
¯nd a payo®-learning speci¯cation which ¯ts reasonably well across di®erent games, then EWA
with payo® learning can be used on naturally-occurring data sets, taking the study of learning
outside the lab and providing new challenges.
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Table 1: Payo®s in centipede games, Nagel-Tang (1998)
Even player number choices
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Odd player 3 2 8 8 8 8 8 8
number choices 5 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 2 3 16 16 16 16 16
5 11 4 4 4 4 4
7 2 3 6 32 32 32 32
5 11 22 8 8 8 8
9 2 3 6 11 64 64 64
5 11 22 45 16 16 16
11 2 3 6 11 22 128 128
5 11 22 45 90 32 32
13 2 3 6 11 22 44 256
5 11 22 45 90 180 64
Table 2: Relative frequencies (%) choices in centipede games, Nagel-Tang (1998)
Odd numbers % Even numbers %
1 .5 2 .9
3 1.6 4 1.7
5 5.4 6 11.3
7 26.1 8 33.1
9 33.1 10 31.1
11 22.5 12 14.3
13 10.8 14 7.7
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Table 3: Transitions after lower-number (take) choices, Nagel-Tang (1998)
Choice in period t+1 after \Take"
choice in t 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Total no.
2 .28 .08 0.32 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.08 25
4 .11 .11 0.40 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.02 47
6 .05 .32 0.41 0.14 0.06 0.01 296
8 .01 .05 .56 .36 .02 .01 594
10 .01 .12 .73 .14 .01 353
12 .03 .05 .07 .83 .02 59
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 Total no.
1 .07 .29 .21 .07 .21 .07 .07 14
3 .04 .09 .44 .13 .18 .09 .02 45
5 .01 .06 .20 .47 .15 .08 .03 156
7 .01 .04 .60 .28 .07 617
9 .01 .08 .62 .26 .03 545
11 .17 .60 .23 173
13 .09 .91 46
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Table 4: Transitions after higher-number (pass) choices, Nagel-Tang (1998)
Choice in period t+1 after \Pass"
choice in t 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Total no.
2 0
4 .50 .50 2
6 .08 .23 .15 .33 .18 .03 39
8 .01 .04 .29 .49 .15 .04 .01 388
10 .01 .01 .08 .40 .40 .06 .03 572
12 .01 .03 .10 .21 .54 .11 364
14 .06 .10 .19 .65 231
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 Total no.
3 1.00 1
5 .60 .20 .20 5
7 .01 .06 .25 .48 .10 .06 .04 156
9 .01 .04 .33 .48 .11 .02 446
11 .01 .02 .10 .31 .43 .12 490
13 .01 .05 .10 .34 .50 276
Table 5.  Log Likelihoods and Parameter Estimates of the Various Adaptive Learning Models  
 
 
Model 
 
 
 
LL 
 
Mean Parameter Estimates 
 Number of 
Parameters 
In sample Out of 
sample 
 
f 
 
d 
 
k 
 
N(0) 
 
l 
Odd Players         
    Reinforcement 2 -2713.2 -1074.5 0.92 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 
    Belief 3 -3474.2 -1553.1 1.00 1.00 0.00 100.00 0.57 
    EWA, Recent Actual Payoff 5 -2667.6 -1069.8 0.91 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.01 
    EWA, Payoff Clairvoyance 5 -2596.6 -1016.8 0.91 0.32 1.00 1.00 0.01 
         
Even Players         
    Reinforcement 2 -2831.8 -991.7 0.92 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 
    Belief 3 -3668.9 -1556.0 0.87 1.00 0.00 0.16 0.04 
   EWA, Recent Actual Payoff 5 -2811.9 -983.0 0.91 0.15 1.00 1.00 0.01 
  EWA, Payoff Clairvoyance 5 -2791.4 -953.2 0.90 0.24 1.00 7.91 0.13 
 
Table 6.  A Comparison between Single Agent Model and Mean of Individual-Level Model: EWA-Clairvoyance 
 
 
Model 
 
LL 
 
Mean Parameter Estimates (Std. Dev.) 
 In sample Out of 
sample 
 
f 
 
d 
 
k 
 
N0 
 
l 
Odd Players        
     Single Agent Model -2596.8 -1016.8 0.91 0.32 1.00 1.00 0.01 
     Average of Individual Model -76.5 
(27.3) 
-35.2 
(15.2) 
0.92 
(0.15) 
0.44 
(0.34) 
0.38 
(0.45) 
1.84 
(3.59) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
Even Players        
    Single Agent Model -2791.4 -992.3 0.90 0.24 0.00 7.91 0.13 
    Average of Individual Model -80.7 
(25.2) 
-31.2 
(14.5) 
0.90 
(0.15) 
0.47 
(0.33) 
0.34 
(0.46) 
3.94 
(5.66) 
0.17 
(0.18) 
 
 
Table 7: A Cluster Analysis Using Individual Level Estimates 
 
 
Mean Parameter Estimates (Std. Dev.) 
Odd Players Even Players 
Number 
of subjects 
 
f  
 
d 
 
k 
Number 
of subjects 
 
f  
 
d 
 
k 
20 0.96 
(0.07) 
0.40 
(0.35) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
21 0.96 
(0.08) 
0.48 
(0.36) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
10 0.82 
(0.20) 
0.51 
(0.33) 
0.99 
(0.01) 
9 0.76 
(0.17) 
0.44 
(0.27) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
 
 
Figure 1: EWA’s Model Parametric Space 
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Figure 2a: Transition Behavior: Actual Data 
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Figure 2b: Predicted Transition Behavior: EWA-Payoff Clairvoyance (Single Agent Model) 
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Figure 2c: Predicted Transition Behavior: EWA-Payoff Clairvoyance (Individual Model) 
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Figure 3a: EWA (Payoff Clairvoyance, Full Update) Model Parameter Patches: Odd Subjects 
 
 
 
Figure 3b: EWA (Payoff Clairvoyance, Full Update) Model Parameter Patches: Even Subjects 
 
